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Strategic Parasitism, Professional
Strategists and Policy Choices
The Influence of George Lindsey and Robert
Sutherland on Canadian Denuclearisation,
1962-1972
JOHN KEESS
Abstract : Between 1957 and 1963, Canada acquired numerous nuclear
delivery systems to fulfill commitments to the defence of North America
and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). In 1972, Pierre
Trudeau’s government divested most of these systems. Much of the literature
ascribes Trudeau’s decision to purely political reasons. By examining the
contributions of two operational researchers from the Defence Research
Board, Dr. R.J. Sutherland and Dr. George Lindsey, this article assesses
the influence of professional advice on denuclearisation. This research
has found that Lindsey and Sutherland provided a strategic grammar
which helped shape the nature and timing of partial denuclearisation.

I

n 1963, canadian defence scientist Dr. R.J. Sutherland
gave an extraordinary talk at the National Defence College.
The Cuban Missile Crisis had occurred the year before, NATO
was working through tortuous arrangements for the allied control
of nuclear weapons and the Sino-Soviet split was metastasising.1
Sutherland surveyed these developments from a Canadian point of
view. The balance of world power had tilted inexorably toward the
big powers, with significant consequences for small countries like

R.J. Sutherland, “Trends in Strategic Weapons and Concepts – Lecture to the
National Defence College by R.J. Sutherland,” 11 March 1963, III.72, vol. 1, 87/253,
Lindsey-Sutherland fonds, Directorate of Heritage and History (DHH).

1  
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Canada. Unhappily, it forced a rethink of Canada’s nuclear policy
after six gruelling years of negotiation, acquisitions and planning.
Significantly, many of Sutherland’s ideas presaged those of the
much better known Hans J. Morgenthau in his influential “The
Four Paradoxes of Nuclear Strategy,” published the following year.2
Sutherland expressed original and innovative thinking in an era
of Canadian strategic thought that would later be taken by some
as “a posture of dependence for intellectual nourishment upon the
debates of others”—a state described by Colin S. Gray as “strategic
theoretical parasitism.”3
More parochial concerns soon dominated the minds of the officers
in the lecture hall. In 1964, Lester B. Pearson’s Liberal government
tabled the 1964 White Paper on Defence, starting a wave of changes
over the next twenty years that are widely seen to have ended the
“golden age” of Canada’s peacetime military.4 These reforms, which
accelerated under the government of Pierre Trudeau, encompassed
everything from uniforms to bilingualism and the reduction of
Canada’s NATO commitment. One key element of this shift was
the divestment of nuclear weapons: having acquired a significant
arsenal of nuclear surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), air-to-air rockets,
gravity bombs and surface-to-surface rockets in 1963 and 1964, the
Canadian government retired all of these systems in 1972 save the
air-to-air rockets, which were finally taken out of use in 1984.
To some historians and commentators, nuclear divestment
embodies political meddling in operational matters with the resultant
military decline—a symptom of the amateurism and naiveté of
outsiders who had unfortunately gained access to the policy-making
machinery.5 Although there has been extensive research into Canadian

Hans J. Morgenthau, “The Four Paradoxes of Nuclear Strategy,” The American
Political Science Review, 58, 2 (March 1964): 23-35.
3  
Peter Kasurak, A National Force: The Evolution of Canada’s Army, 1950-2000
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2003), 72-73; and Colin S. Gray,
“The Need for Independent Canadian Strategic Thought,” Canadian Defence
Quarterly 1, 1 (Summer 1971): 6-12.
4  
J.L. Granatstein and Robert Bothwell, Pirouette: Pierre Trudeau and Canadian
Foreign Policy (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1990), 234; and John A. English, Lament for an Army:
The Decline of Canadian Military Professionalism (Toronto: Irwin, 1998), 51.
5  
Sean Maloney, Learning to Love the Bomb: Canada’s Nuclear Weapons During the
Cold War (Washington: Potomac Books, 2007), 373. See also Gray, “The Need for
Independent Canadian Strategic Thought,” 6.
2  
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nuclear weapons acquisition, comparatively little has explored the
reasons for divestment. Sean Maloney has written a well-researched
book on Canada’s relationship with nuclear weapons, but its emphasis
is overwhelmingly on decisions to acquire particular systems between
1951 and 1964, with very little to be said about denuclearisation—
in fact, only four dedicated pages.6 Erika Simpson, in NATO and
the Bomb: Canadian Defenders Confront Critics, puts forward
the interesting thesis that two groups of policy makers—pro-nuclear
“defenders” who “feared abandonment” and anti-nuclear “critics” who
“feared entrapment”—drove policy making.7 However, by emphasising
groups of individuals and their foundational experiences, Simpson’s
analysis de-emphasises very real and important technological and
strategic changes throughout the period. She also devotes little space
to divestment. Andrew Richter, in Avoiding Armageddon: Canadian
Military Strategy and Nuclear Weapons, 1950-1963, takes a different
view. Richter contests Gray’s “parasitism” thesis by highlighting
the rich operational research (OR) work on the subject of nuclear
weapons that built up in Canada during the 1950s and early 1960s.
But Richter’s study ends in 1963, meaning that the OR contribution
to denuclearisation is not present in the historical record.8 Even
the technical history published by John Clearwater provides only a
short summary of divestment.9 There seems to be some agreement
that divestment came primarily from political sources and especially
from Pierre Trudeau—a sort of Trudeau ex machina, marked by
“the triumph of the amateurs over the professionals.”10 Because this
stated assumption has not been examined in significant detail, it is
worth asking: did any professional strategists influence the decision
to denuclearise?
This article has found that a long line of strategic thinking in
the Canadian operational research community, particularly by R.J.
Sutherland and George R. Lindsey, influenced the decision to partially
denuclearise in 1972. Gray can be forgiven for presuming a lack of

Maloney, Learning to Love the Bomb, 369-73.
Erika Simpson, NATO and the Bomb: Canadian Defenders Confront Critics
(Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2001), 41, 72.
8  
Andrew Richter, Avoiding Armageddon: Canadian Military Strategy and Nuclear
Weapons (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2002), 6-7.
9  
John Clearwater, Canadian Nuclear Weapons: The Untold Story of Canada’s Cold
War Arsenal (Toronto: Dundurn, 1998), 73-74, 172-73, 215-16.
10  
Maloney, Learning to Love the Bomb, 372.
6  
7  
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strategic thinking in Canadian defence policy. The Defence Research
Board’s (DRB) operational researchers produced numerous studies
that framed Canadian nuclear commitments in a wider strategic
context, but long walls of classification hid their work. Fortunately
for the student of Canadian military history and defence policy,
academics have begun to chip away at previously classified archival
materials. Richter’s Avoiding Armageddon has been complemented
by a growing academic interest in the contributions of the Canadian
OR community. J.S. Ridler and Jonathan Turner have both written
excellent PhD dissertations on the influence of the DRB and Matt
Wiseman has published a very helpful collection of George Lindsey’s
work from the Laurier Military History Archives.11
This survey will unfold in four broad areas. Firstly, the paper
provides a brief technical and political background to the divestment
debate. It will then examine how the Cuban Missile Crisis and
other strategic developments in the 1960s affected discussions and
commitments surrounding nuclear weapons in the 1964 White
Paper on Defence. The paper will also examine how evolving
thought around the topic of deterrence and nuclear weapons affected
the major nuclear policy decisions of the Pearson and Trudeau
governments. Finally, in light of the decision to pursue partial
denuclearisation in 1972, this paper will assess the contributions of
the OR community to the 1969 Defence Policy Review (DPR) and
the 1971 Defence White Paper.

background: nuclear weapons, alliances and
operational research
Before looking too deeply into the impact of Lindsey’s and
Sutherland’s thinking, it is worth discussing what operational
research is and how it was conducted in Canada during the early
Cold War. Operational research, classically defined, is “the scientific
Jonathan Turner, “The Defence Research Board of Canada, 1947 to 1977” (PhD
dissertation, University of Toronto, 2012); Jason Sean Ridler, “State Scientist:
Omond McKillop Solandt and Government Science in War and Hostile Peace, 19391956” (PhD dissertation, Royal Military College of Canada, 2001); and Matthew
S. Wiseman, ed., The Selected Works of George R. Lindsey: Operational Research,
Strategic Studies and Canadian Defence in the Cold War (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 2019).

11  
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method of providing executive departments with a quantitative basis
for decisions regarding the operations under their control.”12 The
field originated during the Second World War when the Royal Air
Force (RAF) applied quantitative analysis to improve the British
response to German bombing raids. By combining expertise in
physics to optimise the placement of radar stations with a detailed
statistical breakdown of German attack patterns, British operational
researchers gave RAF leadership critical advice on the timing of
defensive patrols and the organisation of effective command and
control structures.13 The Royal Navy and British Army took note
and soon OR methods were being applied by all three British
services with enthusiastic support from operational research teams
established by the Canadian services.
This early flowering of OR soon encountered a post-war frost.
The Canadian Army, Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) and Royal
Canadian Air Force (RCAF) disbanded their OR sections as part
of demobilisation in 1945, but they quickly regretted the decision
as the need for a national OR capability became clear. In 1949, the
services and the Defence Research Board (DRB) —the Department
of National Defence’s (DND) larger body for coordinating defence
research established in 1947—agreed to revive an OR capability by
coordinating and partially amalgamating the various services’ research
sections through a new Operational Research Group (ORG).14 The
ORG’s original function was to provide a pool of civilian scientists
to conduct research across each of the military’s services, prevent
duplication and oversee limited tri-service research.15
Lindsey and Sutherland played important parts in the early years
of Canada’s Cold War OR community. They had much in common.
Both men had experience serving in the Second World War—Lindsey
with Royal Canadian Artillery, Canadian Operational Research
Group and the British Army Research Group, and Sutherland with
D.J. Goodspeed, A History of The Defence Research Board of Canada (Ottawa:
Queen’s Printer, 1958), 162.
13  
Goodspeed, A History of The Defence Research Board of Canada, 162-63.
14  
The operational research section changed names several times, including
Operational Research Establishment (ORE), Defence Operational Research
Establishment (DORE) and Defence Research and Analysis Establishment (DRAE).
In internal documents from the period these titles were often used interchangeably.
For the purposes of this paper, either the period-appropriate acronym or DRAE will
be used to describe the DRB’s OR section.
15  
Goodspeed, A History of The Defence Research Board of Canada, 168-69.
12  
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The Lord Strathcona’s Horse (Royal Canadians).16 Both gained their
PhDs after the war— Lindsey in nuclear physics and Sutherland
in economics. And both began their post-war operational research
careers shortly after the ORG’s founding; Lindsey joined to begin
work with the RCAF on continental defence programmes while
Sutherland was deployed to Korea as part of the Canadian Army’s
OR section.17 By the late 1950s, both researchers came to work on
continental defence questions and became close friends.18 In 1963,
after Sutherland became head of the ORG, he wrote of Lindsey as
“the most able operational research man…not only in Canada, but in
any other country.”19 Coming from someone described as “Canada’s
one man equivalent to the RAND Corporation,”20 this was no mean
praise. Though very little correspondence between them is found in
archival sources, it is clear that they had a close relationship based
on close collaboration and mutual respect.
As the 1950s progressed, the ORG’s independent role grew as
changing technological and strategic problems outgrew individual
service imperatives. In particular, the challenge posed by
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) came under the ORG’s
direct purview in the late 1950s.21 As the strategic situation became
more complex in the 1960s, the quantitative focus of traditional
operational research stretched to include questions of larger political
significance, specifically the strategic position that small states
encountered as they sought to navigate the superpower rivalry
between the United States and the Soviet Union. This wide scope
made the ORG an important institution. Indeed, until the 1970s
few organisations outside of the military’s OR community, uniformed
Wiseman, The Selected Works of George R. Lindsey, xvii-xviii; and James Lee and
David Bellamy, “Dr. R.J. Sutherland: A Retrospective,” n.d., III.0, vol. 5, 87/253,
Lindsey-Sutherland fonds, DHH.
17  
Wiseman, The Selected Works of George R. Lindsey, xx; and Lee and Bellamy,
“Dr. R.J. Sutherland: A Retrospective,” III.0, vol. 5, 87/253, Lindsey-Sutherland
fonds, DHH. For an understanding of Sutherland’s work with the Canadian Army
Operational Research Establishment, see A.B. Godefroy, In Peace Prepared:
Innovation and Adaptation in Canada’s Cold War Army (Vancouver: University of
British Columbia Press, 2014).
18  
Lee and Bellamy, “Dr. R.J. Sutherland: A Retrospective,” n.d., III.0, vol. 5,
87/253, Lindsey-Sutherland fonds, DHH.
19  
Wiseman, The Selected Works of George R. Lindsey, xxii.
20  
Lee and Bellamy, “Dr. R.J. Sutherland: A Retrospective,” n.d., III.0, vol. 5,
87/253, Lindsey-Sutherland fonds, DHH.
21  
Goodspeed, A History of The Defence Research Board of Canada, 169.
16  
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advisors, and a smattering of individual academics systematically
studied strategic issues from a Canadian point of view.22 One downside
to this relatively insular community was that thinking stayed inside
the Canadian defence and foreign affairs establishment. Sutherland,
one of the most original and innovative strategic thinkers in Canada,
published only two papers in public journals and collections, with
most of his work remaining classified until the 1990s and 2000s.
Much of his work is still restricted.23 Lindsey published more widely,
but most of his major contributions came after 1972.24
Within government, however, Sutherland’s and Lindsey’s work
circulated widely and their analyses carried considerable weight. Both
men headed the ORG during crucial points in the denuclearisation
decision—Sutherland from 1963 to 1967 and Lindsey from 1967
until DRB’s reorganisation in the 1970s.25 As respective heads of the
operational research section, they had access to both the minister
of national defence and senior military leadership and were often
asked to comment on specific military programmes, concepts and,
on occasion, even drafted speeches.26 They presented directly to
the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence
(SCEAND) and replied directly to queries for comment by Deputy
Ministers and Assistant Deputy Ministers on government papers.27
During the nuclear acquisition debate, for example, most of the papers
that went to the minister first passed Sutherland’s desk. Tellingly,
policy makers outside their normal bureaucratic chain recognised

J.H. Trotman, “A Canadian National Policy Research Institute,” 27 August 1968,
10.1, vol. 2, 87/253, Lindsey-Sutherland fonds, DHH.
23  
Lee and Bellamy, “Dr. R.J. Sutherland: A Retrospective,” III.0, vol. 5, 87/253,
Lindsey-Sutherland fonds, DHH.
24  
Wiseman, The Selected Works of George R. Lindsey, xvii.
25  
Wiseman, The Selected Works of George R. Lindsey, xxv; and John W. Mayne,
History of Operational Research in the Royal Canadian Air Force (Ottawa:
Department of National Defence, 1979), 52.
26  
R.J. Sutherland to Robert Miller (presumed), correspondence, 5 November 1962,
III.45, vol. 8, 87/253, Lindsey-Sutherland fonds, DHH. See also Frank Maas, The
Price of Alliance: The Politics and Procurement of Leopard Tanks for Canada’s
NATO Brigade (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2017), 23-24;
Godefroy, In Peace Prepared, 126; and Kasurak, A National Force, 93.
27  
George R. Lindsey, Strategic Weapons Systems, Stability, and the Possible
Contribution by Canada (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1969). The
forward to this document notes that it “is almost identical with the one prepared for
the information of the members of the Commons Standing Committee on External
Affairs and National Defence.”
22  
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R.J. Sutherland in 1963. [Duncan Cameron/Library and Archives Canada/PA-166257]
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Sutherland’s and Lindsey’s contributions. Canadian diplomat Basil
Robinson, who served as both the Department of External Affairs’
liaison to Diefenbaker and later as Undersecretary of State for
External Affairs thought of Sutherland as a “strategist.”28 Some at
the Department of External Affairs (DEA) thought George Lindsey
was influential enough to consider him a threat. In the words of
Michael Pittfield, the Assistant Secretary to the Privy Council during
the defence reviews, “the last thing [some at DEA] wanted was to
allow George Lindsay [sic] to exist.”29 While assessing influence is
inherently circumstantial, there are few better indicators than open
rivalry. Given their wide circulation in government, it is possible to
plausibly gauge Lindsey’s and Sutherland’s impact by understanding
how they approached complex technical subjects such as deterrence
theory, how they expressed these understandings to policy makers
and then contrasting their understandings and recommendations
with changes in executive documents, such as policy statements and
white papers.
Before discussing Canadian nuclear weapons policy, it is important
to clarify just what those weapons were, when they were acquired
and the reasons for their adoption. When Canada first signed on to
NATO in 1949, it was primarily a political pact that included a set of
military assurances without much detailed military planning.30 This
changed radically with a series of developments in the late 1940s
and early 1950s, notably the Berlin Blockade (1948-1949), the first
Soviet atomic (1949) and hydrogen (1952) weapons tests, and the
Korean War (1950-1953). In 1951, the members of NATO agreed to
establish a force-in-being, directed by Supreme Headquarters Allied
Powers Europe under the leadership of General Dwight Eisenhower as
Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR).31 Between 1950 and
1952, Canadian defence spending tripled. Ottawa quickly assembled
and despatched a ground formation, which after a few name changes
Henry Basil Robinson, interviewed by Robert Bothwell and J.L. Granatstein,
5 August 1987, Ottawa, Accession 20150335, George Metcalf Archival Collection,
Canadian War Museum Military History Research Centre (MHRC).
Granatstein and Bothwell, Pirouette, 20.
29  
Robert Bothwell and J.L. Granatstein, Trudeau’s World: Insiders Reflect on
Foreign Policy, Trade and Defence, 1968-1984 (Vancouver: University of British
Columbia Press, 2017), 39.
30  
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “A Short History of NATO,” accessed 14
April 2019, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/declassified_139339.htm.
31  
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “A Short History of NATO.”
28  
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settled as 4 Canadian Infantry Brigade Group (4 CIBG) in 1957.
An air component, which would become 1 Canadian Air Division (1
CAD) in 1952, began moving its first units to Europe in 1951.32
Although Canadian political leaders did not envision nuclear
acquisitions as part of this increased defence spending, events quickly
brought the nuclear issue to the fore. In 1949, the Allies began
drafting a series of military concepts to align acquisitions, operational
planning and force contributions. After it became clear to the planners
that NATO could not credibly match Soviet conventional forces in
continental Europe, they increasingly relied on nuclear weapons to
bridge the gap. Early NATO strategic concepts, expressed as Military
Committee (MC) resolutions, stressed nuclear retaliation similar in
form to the combined bomber offensive of the Second World War to
deter a Soviet invasion of Western Europe.33 During the 1950s, the
nature of nuclear weapons changed, partially because of advances in
physically smaller “tactical” nuclear weapons—so called because they
were designed to destroy enemy formations instead of enemy cities,
despite often having more power than the bombs dropped on Japan
in 1945. This meant that NATO planners initially intended to use
nuclear weapons not only if they lost the ground battle but for the

Isabel Campbell, Unlikely Diplomats: The Canadian Brigade in Germany, 19511964 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2013), 120; Ray Stouffer,
Swords, Clunks & Widowmakers: The Tumultuous Life of the RCAF’s Original 1
Canadian Air Division (Trenton: Canadian Forces Aerospace Warfare Centre, 2015),
38-68; and Norman Hillmer and J.L. Granatstein, Empire to Umpire: Canada and
the World to the 1990s (Toronto: Copp Clark Longman, 1994), 214-15.
33  
MC 3 pledged all members to “insure the ability to deliver the atomic bomb
promptly,” while MC 14/1, although somewhat coy, clearly meant nuclear weapons
when it commented on “all offensive and defensive means available.” See both
Military Committee, “MC 3 – 19.10.1949, The Strategy Concept for the Defence of
the North Atlantic Area” and Military Committee, “MC 14/1 (Final) – 9.12.1952,
Strategy Guidance” in NATO Strategy Documents, ed. Gregory W. Pedlow, NATO
Archives Online, accessed 13 and 15 April 2019, https://www.nato.int/archives/
strategy.htm.
32  
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ground battle itself.34 This shift put Canadian policy makers in a
bind. Having agreed to participate in an alliance backed by American
nuclear weapons, Canadian leaders now felt pressure to acquire their
own nuclear systems.
Concerns about the defence of North America paralleled these
developments in Europe. Although Canada conducted planning for
the defence of North America using bilateral agreements outside
of NATO, the military alliance depended on the effective defence
of North America and especially the massive nuclear deterrent
wielded by the bombers of the U.S. Air Force’s (USAF) Strategic
Air Command (SAC). So although the defence of Europe and the
defence of North America fell under two separate organisations,
NATO planning documents linked North American and European
defence conceptually.35 Canadian and American staffs, who had been
conducting detailed joint planning for the defence of North America
since the Ogdensburg Agreement of 1940, apprehended the growing
Soviet bomber threat as early as 1947. After the USSR detonated its
first nuclear device in 1949, continental defence took on a new urgency.
As the Soviets fielded increasingly sophisticated technology, staffs
had to adjust the joint Basic Security Plan (BSP) to keep up with
these new threats. In 1951, Canada began allowing SAC overflights
on a case-by-case basis and by 1957 the USAF was operating
tankers and bombers out of Goose Bay.36 In 1952, work began on
an ambitious bi-national air defence system that would eventually
comprise radar lines in Canada’s north, a computerised detection,

MC 48 noted that: “Our studies have indicated that without their immediate
use we could not successfully defend Europe within the resources available […]
Therefore, in the event of a war involving NATO it is militarily essential that NATO
forces should be able to use atomic and thermonuclear weapons in their defense
from the outset.” See “MC 48 (Final) – 22.11.1954, The Most Effective Pattern for
NATO Military Strength for the Next Few Years” in NATO Strategy Documents,
ed. Pedlow, NATO Archives Online, accessed 13 April 2019, https://www.nato.int/
archives/strategy.htm. For further illustration of NATO’s intention to immediately
use nuclear weapons in the defence of Europe, see Military Committee, “MC 14/2
(Rev) (Final Decisions) – 23.5.1957” and “MC 14/3 (Final) – 16.1.1968” in NATO
Strategy Documents, ed. Pedlow, NATO Archives Online, accessed 13 April 2019,
https://www.nato.int/archives/strategy.htm. See also Lawrence Freedman, The
Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 3rd ed. (Houndmills, UK: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003),
20-27.
35  
Maloney, Learning to Love the Bomb, 22-23.
36  
Maloney, Learning to Love the Bomb, 13.
34  
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tracking and control system known as SAGE,37 interceptors and SAM
sites. After lengthy discussions, US and Canadian air defence forces
were integrated under a single command, North American Aerospace
Defense Command (NORAD), in 1958.
By 1957, all three services began to ask for a variety of nuclear
weapons to fulfill these commitments. For continental air defence,
the RCAF requested nuclear-tipped SAMs as well as nuclear air-toair rockets. For 1 CAD, Canada’s aviators argued for a nuclear role
known as strike/reconnaissance, which would require nuclear gravity
bombs. The soldiers wanted nuclear-tipped rocket artillery for 4 CIBG
to keep up with NATO planning that incorporated tactical nuclear
weapons. The sailors, for their part, sought air-dropped nuclear
depth bombs and ship-launched nuclear torpedoes. John Diefenbaker,
elected prime minister in 1957, struggled with this file, unsuccessfully
trying to wrangle both pro- and anti-nuclear factions in his party.
Indeed, a definitive account of his nuclear policy is titled Essence of
Indecision.38 By 1961, Canada had adopted, or had begun to adopt,
a number of nuclear delivery systems to fill these roles, but without
the crucial agreement on accepting warheads. At home, the RCAF
received BOMARC surface-to-air missiles, CF-101 Voodoo aircraft
capable of delivering MB-1/AIR-2 Genie unguided nuclear rockets. In
Europe, the Canadian Army received MGR-1 “Honest John” surfaceto-surface rockets for the brigade in Europe and 1 CAD received
CF-104 Starfighter aircraft configured for, and committed to, the
nuclear strike/reconnaissance role. Without their “physics packages,”
however, these systems were basically useless. Although Canada
would adopt a number of nuclear-capable anti-submarine warfare
(ASW) systems, it would never conclude an agreement to equip them
with nuclear warheads (see Table 1).
Diefenbaker’s anti-American leanings and personal dislike
of American president John F. Kennedy compounded the already
complicated economic, technical and political issues involved in
equipping Canadian-owned systems with American warheads.
Diefenbaker, who worried about American incursion into Canadian

SAGE stood for “Semi-Autonomous Ground Environment” and was an early
computer network not unlike the modern internet. See Maloney, Learning to Love
the Bomb, 24.
38  
Patricia McMahon, Essence of Indecision: Diefenbaker’s Nuclear Policy 19571963 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2009).
37  
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cultural and political life, saw no reason to spend his political capital
on nuclear issues and let the matter fester. The talks ground out
over several years and the interminable confusion provided Lester
B. Pearson, the leader of the opposition, with the grounds to
force an election in 1963. Upon gaining office, the Liberals quickly
ended the drawn-out nuclear negotiations and arranged for joint
custody and control of the warheads for all systems save ASW. In
these arrangements, the warheads remained under joint CanadianAmerican security arrangements with direct contact to the warheads
being controlled by American custodial detachments. In times of
operational necessity, the custodial detachments would release the
weapons to Canadian crews to mount on Canadian delivery systems.
Service-to-service agreements and specific doctrine governed the
operational employment of individual weapons; for example, the release
of air defence warheads to Canadian aircraft depended on closely
synchronised NORAD and Canadian air defence alert states, but the
use of nuclear systems by 1 CAD was governed by specific NATO
operational plans (see Table 1). Pearson’s Cabinet also authorised
closer air defence measures, such as allowing the dispersal of nucleararmed US interceptors to Canadian airfields during periods of high
international tension.39
Although Pearson accepted the warheads, he did so
unenthusiastically. Accepting the warheads fulfilled a number
of defence commitments, but many of these commitments, in his
view, did not best serve Canada’s interests. Thus, while the services
began implementing the technical agreements made with their US
counterparts, the government immediately began looking for nonnuclear roles. By 1972, the Liberal governments of Pearson and,
after 1968, Pierre Trudeau succeeded in divesting all nuclear systems
except the AIR-2 Genie.40 This search for new roles in an evolving
strategic balance would prove to be a major task for Sutherland and
Lindsey in the decade ahead.
The first of Sutherland’s public articles, “Canada’s Long Term
Strategic Situation” published in 1962, is a good starting point to
The specific alert level was the NORAD “Defence Condition 3” or DEFCON 3,
given during a period of “delicate or strained international relations.” See Maloney,
Learning to Love the Bomb, 194, 345.
40  
Clearwater, Canadian Nuclear Weapons, 58-59, 84, 92, 178, 232-33, 236-38; and
Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “U.S. Nuclear Warheads, 1945-2009,”
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 65, 4 (July/August 2009): 76.
39  
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Table 1: Nuclear Weapons in Canadian Arsenalsi
Delivery
System

Weapon /
Warhead

BOMARC

W40

Purpose

Yield
7-10 kt

Air Defence
CF-101B
Voodoo

CF-104
Starfighter

MB1-AIR 2
Genie / W25

1.5 kt

B 57 gravity
bomb / W57

5-20 kt
(variable)

B 43 gravity
bomb

Tactical
nuclear strike

1.45 Mt
(variable)

B 28

MGR-1
Honest John

W31

1 Mt

Corps-level
nuclear
artillery

2, 20, 40
kt
(variable)

Release Procedure
At DEFCON 1, defensive nuclear weapons
release sought by C-in-C NORAD from
designated national representatives with predelegation. Individual release controlled by
sector commanders.ii

SACEUR receives US national authority to
release nuclear weapons, transmits release
authority to US custodial sections. Weapons
employed as part of pre-designated SACEUR
plans.
US custodial detachments to receive
authorisation for release from national
channels.
Once released, launch of individual rockets to
be controlled at the Corps level – for 4 CIBG,
this was I (British) Corps.

Divested
1972

1984

iii

1972

1972

Anti-Submarine Warfare – Planned but not acquired
Mk 101 “Lulu”
10 kt
/ W34
CP-107
Mk 105
Argus
“Hotpoint” /
10 kt
(RCAF) / CPW34
122 Neptune
(RCAF)
5-20 kt
B 57 / W57
(variable)
CP-121
Tracker
(RCN)

Mk 101 “Lulu”
/ W34

CH-124 Sea
King (RCN)

Mk 101 “Lulu”
/ W34
Mk 105
“Hotpoint” /
W34

ASROC
Dual-capable;
(Ship
nuclear delivery
mounted,
based on Mk.46
Restigouche
torpedo / W44
class)iv

AntiSubmarine
Warfare

10 kt
10 kt

Not applicable. Although these platforms were capable of
carrying American nuclear weapons, no government-togovernment agreement existed for their joint custody and
release in times of operational necessity.

10 kt

5 kt

i

John Clearwater, Canadian Nuclear Weapons , 58-59, 84, 92, 178, 232-33, 236-38; Sean Maloney, Learning to Love the
Bomb, 313-14, 323-38, 355-57.
ii
There were significant technical differences between the CF-101 AIR-2 Genie and CIM-10 BOMARC in how these
permissions were obtained and transmitted. For a detailed technical discussion, see Maloney, Learning to Love the Bomb ,
345-49.
iii
Two CF-101s were reconfigured as EF-101Bs and kept on in an electronic warfare capacity without mounting the AIR-2
until 1987.
iv
The ASROC was acquired and mounted on RCN Restigouche-class ships in a conventional role.
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understand the basis of his thinking about Canadian participation in
nuclear roles during the 1960s. Written as a response to an emerging
body of advocates for Canadian neutrality, Sutherland made the case
for continuing a policy of alliance participation.41 In Sutherland’s
view, regardless of its political alignment, Canada’s strategic situation
was dominated by political and economic “invariables” and “broad
national interests.”42 Of these considerations, Canada’s proximity to,
and economic connectedness with, the United States was paramount.
This closeness meant that it was basically impossible for Canada to be
secure without the Americans being secure and vice versa.43 Canadian
influence depended on how much Ottawa mattered to Washington
and, to a lesser extent, European capitals. But how best to matter?
Sutherland tied Western security directly to the maintenance of SAC’s
nuclear bomber force. If Canada wanted an independent voice, it had
to meaningfully participate in these important aspects of Western
defence.44 These hard invariables were complemented by softer
considerations, such as a cultural affinity for Europe, which inexorably
involved Ottawa in European security.45 Whether Canadians liked it
or not, they were subject to an “involuntary guarantee” of security
commitments from Washington. To maintain its independent voice,
Canada needed to play “a significant role in Western security” to
both be “present at the table [where] we can serve our own interests”
and “maintain real influence in Washington.”46
To understand these issues further, it is necessary to understand
some of the jargon involved in deterrence theory. In plain English,
a “first strike” occurs when combatant “A” begins nuclear hostilities
against combatant “B” in an attempt to destroy B’s ability to
retaliate. This usually means that the first strike would be directed
against B’s military forces (a “counter-force” strike). If A fails to
destroy B’s forces, B might use its remaining nuclear forces in a
“second strike” to retaliate against A with the objective of making the
retaliation as painful as possible by targeting cities (a “counter-value”

Matthew P. Trudgen and Joel J. Sokolsky, “The Canadian strategic debate of the
early 1960s,” International Journal 67, 1 (2011-2012): 184, 187-88.
42  
R.J. Sutherland, “Canada’s Long Term Strategic Situation,” International Journal
17 (1962): 201.
43  
Sutherland, “Canada’s Long Term Strategic Situation,” 203.
44  
Sutherland, “Canada’s Long Term Strategic Situation,” 212-14.
45  
Sutherland, “Canada’s Long Term Strategic Situation,” 205.
46  
Sutherland, “Canada’s Long Term Strategic Situation,” 208.
41  
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strike). It is possible for both sides to have a second strike capability
and, given the right technical ability and resources, both A and B
might have secure second-strike capabilities—that is, the ability on
both sides to sustain a counter-force first strike from an adversary
and retaliate with a counter-value second strike. When neither side
has a decisive technological or quantitative edge in defensive or
offensive capabilities, the situation is balanced; when the nature of
the cumulative capabilities disincentivises a first strike, it produces
strategic stability.47 Because Canada did not have an independent
nuclear capability, it could not have a true nuclear strategy of its
own. Even so, Ottawa had to plan around the likely actions of powers
with independent nuclear deterrents, putting Canadian strategists in
the unenviable position of trying to contribute to strategic stability
while also having no say in the decision to launch—or not launch—a
first strike. In this sense, Canadian policy required less of a nuclear
strategy than a strategy involving nuclear weapons.
The state of technological development in the early 1960s required
consistent investment in new technologies to encourage strategic
stability. Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, introduced in the late
1950s, showed promise in replacing the bomber as the ideal weapon for
an attacker due to their speed and invulnerability to conventional air
defences. Yet early ICBMs were limited in number and too inaccurate
to ensure an effective first strike. By virtue of being liquid-fuelled,
ICBMs were slow and vulnerable themselves, which made them a
poor second-strike option. Denying Soviet bombers, which were more
accurate and carried larger loads, access to SAC targets remained
vital for the Americans to conduct an effective second strike.48 Still,
the trend was for ICBMs to replace the bomber as the primary means
of delivery. Once that happened, a water-tight defence against nuclear
strike would become impossible, requiring a new way of thinking
about nuclear weapons.
“Canada’s Long Term Strategic Situation” encapsulated many
key concepts that drove Sutherland’s and Lindsey’s thinking. First
was the unity of security. Security was tied to Canadian national
Thérèse Delpech, Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century: Lessons from the Cold
War for a New Era of Strategic Piracy (Santa Monica: RAND, 2012), 37-40. Delpech
challenges the idea that “strategic stability” is a useful term as the US, Russia and
China have yet to agree on a precise definition. This being said, the way in which the
term will be used in this paper is from a Western point of view.
48  
Sutherland, “Canada’s Long Term Strategic Situation,” 212-14.
47  
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interests. Although NATO was not connected to NORAD formally,
it was connected conceptually. Second was the security-resource
calculation. Canada needed to recognise that it had limited resources
and should conduct an unemotional calculation of how those resources
could be devoted to achieving maximum security and sovereignty.
There were no sacred commitments or capabilities. Finally, there
was the need for strategic-technical flexibility. Canada could not
influence larger strategic and technological trends, but it had to
respond to them.

strategic changes in the early sixties: a lecture, a
report, and a white paper
Sutherland further developed these ideas in a 1963 lecture at the
National Defence College. With regard to weapons, Sutherland
concluded that “[t]he important point, it seems to me, is that there
isn’t anything new or exciting.”49 Both the Americans and the
Soviets were well on their way to developing secure second-strike
deterrents and this was unlikely to change. On the other hand, as big
wars became unthinkable, small wars become more likely, making
conventional forces more important. During the 1950s, US President
Dwight Eisenhower’s administration adopted a doctrine of “massive
retaliation,” whereby the US would leverage its superior capacity to
produce nuclear weapons as a way of saving on defence. Because the
Americans could build so many nuclear weapons, the thinking went,
it would be impossible for the Soviets to destroy all of them in a first
strike. This gave Washington the freedom to cut back on expensive
conventional forces by credibly threatening any Soviet attack on the
West with an overwhelming nuclear response.50 Robert McNamara,
Kennedy’s Secretary of Defense, had long criticised this doctrine on
the grounds that US reliance on nuclear weapons lacked credibility
because of its disproportionality. If Moscow sponsored a group of
fanatical East German communists to conduct a series of crossborder raids on West German military targets, could Washington
really be expected to respond with a nuclear strike? Without
sufficient conventional forces, the Americans could not counter
Sutherland, “Canada’s Long Term Strategic Situation,” 212-14.
Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 72-74.

49  
50  
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Soviet provocations below the threshold of an all-out attack on the
West. Paradoxically, without the ability to realistically respond
to such provocations, the US would lose further credibility. The
Kennedy administration obligingly boosted US defence spending,
but mainly on non-nuclear capabilities as part of a new doctrine
of “flexible response” that would give American policy leaders the
widest possible range of options in a crisis.51 Sutherland praised this
new way of thinking which put the Americans at “the cutting edge of
diplomacy.”52 From a Canadian perspective, however, he also warned
that these capabilities were meant to bolster “US national interests
and US power to maintain these interests.”53 In other words, with
greater flexibility, the US would depend less on its allies, limiting
their influence. These new limits had been all too apparent in Cuba.
Canadian prime ministers from both major political parties had
shown a willingness to spend considerable sums on defence to gain a
place at the table in Washington. During the Cuban Missile Crisis,
Kennedy had shown little desire to take a seat himself. The exact
chronology of the crisis will not be covered here, but it is important
to review a few of the key events. By the autumn of 1962, the
Canadian political debate surrounding the acceptance of nuclear
warheads had stalled. The Tories came out of the June election
with a shaky minority and little political incentive to push for a
major policy decision before an expected vote of no confidence.54
The only major push came from Howard Green, Diefenbaker’s
Secretary of State for External Affairs, who sought a third way on
the question of warheads. His plan was to maintain the BOMARC
SAM systems and CF-101 Voodoo interceptors that Canada had
already paid for, but to keep the warheads in the US on standby

Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 218.
Sutherland, “Trends in Strategic Weapons and Concepts – Lecture to the National
Defence College by R.J. Sutherland,” 11 March 1963, III.72, vol. 1, 87/253, LindseySutherland fonds, DHH; and William Rosenau, “The Kennedy Administration, US
Foreign Internal Security Assistance, and the Challenge of ‘Subterranean War,’ 196163,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 14, 3 (Autumn 2003): 72-73.
53  
Sutherland, “Trends in Strategic Weapons and Concepts – Lecture to the National
Defence College by R.J. Sutherland,” 11 March 1963, III.72, vol. 1, 87/253, LindseySutherland fonds, DHH.
54  
McMahon, Essence of Indecision, 146.
51  
52  
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should they be needed in the event of an “emergency.”55 The RCAF
and USAF opposed the plan on technical grounds, as transporting
the warheads would require a large fleet of specialised aircraft.
Moreover, claiming nuclear innocence while planning to fly in
warheads to use on Canadian systems in a crisis would fool no one
while simultaneously making the response slower. If Canada wanted
its cake, it would have to eat it too.
Nuclear weapons and continental defence quickly became less
than academic questions. Between 15 and 16 October 1962, US
surveillance aircraft found Soviet SS-4 and SS-5 IntermediateRange Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) in Cuba. These missiles greatly
worried the Americans because the IRBMs could potentially deliver
an accurate first strike on SAC with almost no warning and no way
to stop them. Kennedy and his administration began looking at
options on 16 October and Canada was warned through intelligence
channels on 20 October about the brewing crisis. It was not until 22
October that Kennedy consulted with Diefenbaker on the political
level. Feeling snubbed, Diefenbaker undercut the Americans when he
publicly proposed UN inspections of Cuban disarmament. The Prime
Minister also dragged his feet for two days before issuing specific alert
conditions to Canadian air and naval forces dedicated to NORAD
and BSP commitments.56 An embarrassed defence minister, Douglas
Harkness, quietly ordered the RCAF and RCN to take alert-like
measures without going on alert themselves.57 By the time the formal
alert order was issued on 25 October, it had “a hollow ring to many
US officials.”58 However careful pre-crisis operational planning may
have been, it could not bypass unresolved aspects of national strategy
in Diefenbaker’s cabinet. Even basic military problems persisted. The
RCN and RCAF did not have an effective joint headquarters during
the crisis, meaning that it was difficult to coordinate a Canadian
This idea started as a potential stopgap measure by the RCAF in the event that
a crisis occurred before negotiations could be completed. Green and Diefenbaker
latched onto it as a way out of difficult negotiations and went as far as announcing
the measure in the House before talking it over with the Americans. See Maloney,
Learning to Love the Bomb, 262.
56  
For a good description of alert statuses, see Maloney, Learning to Love the Bomb,
187-96.
57  
Peter Haydon, “The Cuban Missile Crisis 50 Years Later,” Canadian Naval Review
8, 3 (Fall 2012): 12. See also Marc Milner, Canada’s Navy: The First Century, 2nd
ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010), 234-35.
58  
McMahon, Essence of Indecision, 150.
55  

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2020

19

Canadian Military History, Vol. 29 [2020], Iss. 1, Art. 16
20

Strategic Parasitism, Professional Strategists and Policy Choices

response to the threat without involving US command linkages.59
Defence planning had seemed almost intentionally blind to the close
relationship between war and politics. If Canada had bought all kinds
of expensive systems to gain the right of consultation in a crisis, then
the investment seemed a bad one.
Sutherland did not speak to a great extent on the crisis itself,
but his commentary on the changed strategic situation which
followed it marked a new direction in his thinking on the relation
of nuclear weapons to Canada’s national interests. He noted that
“when the period of extreme tension had passed—there was a strong
reaction. This is true of France, Britain, Pakistan, certain of the
South American countries and Canada.”60 He also touched on the
issue of consultation. “Many Europeans,” he noted, “were no less
impressed by the fact that the USA acted without consultation with
its European allies, and that if the Cuban incident had led to allout war Western Europe would have participated in the disaster.”61
When it came to questions of splitting atoms and splitting cities,
Washington would do what was best in a narrow conception of its
own self-interest. After being elected with a minority government in
April 1963, Pearson attempted to chart a new way forward. Having
used the issue of nuclear weapons as a means to pound the Tories
both in the House and during the election, his government quickly
agreed to accept warheads for air defence and NATO commitments
to Europe, with a long-term goal of finding non-nuclear roles. It
was with this in mind that Pearson “initiated a searching review
of defence programmes and activities.”62 Paul Hellyer, Pearson’s
defence minister from 1963 to 1967, did not trust normal channels to
undertake sufficiently creative thinking on defence policy. Instead, he
named two ad-hoc committees: the Ad Hoc Committee on a Mobile
Force, chaired by Brigadier H.Q. Love, and the Ad Hoc Committee
Peter C. Haydon, The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis: Canadian Involvement
Reconsidered (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1993), 219-21.
60  
Sutherland, “Trends in Strategic Weapons and Concepts – Lecture to the National
Defence College by R.J. Sutherland,” 11 March 1963, III.72, vol. 1, 87/253, LindseySutherland fonds, DHH.
61  
Sutherland, “Trends in Strategic Weapons and Concepts – Lecture to the National
Defence College by R.J. Sutherland,” 11 March 1963, III.72, vol. 1, 87/253, LindseySutherland fonds, DHH.
62  
Lucien Cardin, “Address by the Hon Lucien Cardin, Associate Minister of
National Defence, to the National Defence College,” July 1963, 5.7, vol. 1, 87/253,
Lindsey-Sutherland fonds, DHH.
59  
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on Defence Policy, chaired by Sutherland. While Love’s committee
looked at the specifics of equipping a globally deployable force,
Sutherland’s committee examined Canada’s defence policy more
broadly. Sutherland is described by historian Peter Kasurak as the
“only star” on the committee and its final report came to be known
as the Sutherland Report.63
The report injected a dry realism about Canada’s power into
policy circles, driving a look at security-resource allocations in an
unsentimental way. Sutherland attributed Canada’s outsized postwar influence to two unique circumstances—namely, the destruction
of much of Europe’s industrial plants during the Second World War
and a booming post-war economy that powered high defence spending
during the 1950s. These conditions no longer existed. Canada simply
could not afford to maintain its current defence commitments
without a significant increase in defence spending to offset climbing
real costs.64 Moreover, the growth of European economies meant that
Canada’s relative power was in decline. With this in mind, a strict
triage, which reflected the unity of security, was in order. The top
priority was the defence of North America, then that of the “North
Atlantic Community” (i.e. NATO), then “the rest of the world” (UN
and perhaps Commonwealth commitments).65 As George Lindsey
later noted, this change in the strategic situation moved DRAE away
from a technical focus and further towards “a new type of defence
research, involving strategic and social studies.”66 A wider view would
focus less on the absolute effectiveness of individual systems and more
on the relative benefit of maintaining one capability over another.
The Sutherland Report reflected this change in thinking. Canada
did not possess an independent nuclear deterrent and had no desire
to build one. By not doing so, Canada abandoned any ability to
realistically remain neutral in a world conflict. Its geographic
proximity to, and close economic integration with, the US meant
that “Canada’s interests are identified with those of the United States

Kasurak, A National Force, 77; and “Report of the Ad-Hoc Committee on Defence
Policy,” 30 September 1963, III.61, vol. 8, 87/253, Lindsey-Sutherland fonds, DHH.
64  
Kasurak, A National Force, 12-13, 29-30, 75-76.
65  
“Report of the Ad-Hoc Committee on Defence Policy,” 30 September 1963, 11,
III.61, vol. 8, 87/253, Lindsey-Sutherland fonds, DHH.
66  
George R. Lindsey, “The Contribution of Operational Research to National
Defence (1979),” in Wiseman, The Selected Works of George R. Lindsey, 30.
63  
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beyond any possibility of disentanglement.”67 This also meant that
the nation relied on two nuclear-enabled alliances to guarantee its
security: NATO, which used nuclear weapons in its doctrine and
planning, and NORAD, which was designed to protect the nuclear
deterrent provided by SAC. Canada, in the report’s words, “cannot be
a member of a military alliance and at the same avoid responsibility
for the strategic policies which give it reality.”68 If a major war came,
Canada would be involved; its use of American warheads was largely
a technical one. This cool appreciation of technical impacts on the
options open to Canadian decision makers challenges Simpson’s
assertion that the “defenders” advocating for continued participation
in the nuclear aspects of Western alignment worked off a combination
of Second World War sentimentality, fear of diplomatic censure
and “deep-seated loyalty to the United States.”69 Though personal
experience certainly played a part, the pro-nuclear camp had a strong
technical rationale based on reasonable assumptions about Canada’s
place in the international order. Then again, Canada’s participation
in these alliances was a political decision that inevitably brought
wider political factors into the decision-making process in the first
place. As the political and the technical imperatives pulled further
apart, decisions would become harder and harder to make.
Decisions about air defence systems were the easiest to make
because they were the most technical in nature. Although ICBMs
were set to replace manned bombers as the principal means of nuclear
weapons delivery in the coming decade, bombers still provided
greater accuracy and lower cost per megaton to deliver, meaning
that the ability to defend against them constituted an important
part of preserving SAC’s retaliatory capability. If those defensive
systems used nuclear warheads, so be it. As the Soviets continued
to invest less in bombers than in missiles, the utility of an absolute
defence against an assault from aircraft diminished, especially given
the enormous cost of maintaining multiple lines of radar stations and
SAM batteries. Eventually, warning would come to mean a lot more
than a strict defence and that warning could eventually be provided

“Report of the Ad-Hoc Committee on Defence Policy,” 30 September 1963, 56,
III.61, vol. 8, 87/253, Lindsey-Sutherland fonds, DHH.
68  
“Report of the Ad-Hoc Committee on Defence Policy,” 30 September 1963, 37,
III.61, vol. 8, 87/253, Lindsey-Sutherland fonds, DHH.
69  
Simpson, NATO and the Bomb, 184-89.
67  
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at far lower a cost through the use of new radar technologies.70 In a
morbid pro and con, nuclear devastation was now unavoidable in the
event of general war but, short of the apocalypse, increasingly scarce
cash could be freed for other uses.
Canada’s nuclear role in NATO proved to be the most politically
complex issue. Ottawa had deployed a brigade and an air division
to Europe permanently in 1951, before NATO’s embrace of tactical
nuclear weapons. By 1955, NATO planners began reorienting
towards a heavy reliance on tactical nuclear weapons and in 1958
the Military Committee approved new force goals in a document
known as MC 70 to reflect this new reality. MC 70 put Canadian
policy makers in a bind: they had committed a conventional
brigade and air division in 1951 with no expectation of nuclear
entanglements; now they were being asked to take on substantial
nuclear roles in the form of a battery of tactical nuclear rockets
for Canada’s NATO brigade and to take on the nuclear “strike/
reconnaissance” role for 1 CAD.71 Cabinet duly ordered the CF104 Starfighter for 1 CAD in 1959 and MGR-1 Honest Johns for
4 CIBG in 1960.72 Because of the Diefenbaker government’s fencesitting, by the time the platforms were equipped with warheads in
1963-4, the Americans were pushing for more conventional forces to
allow for a new doctrine of flexible response designed to slow nuclear
escalation. Technologically, the new rage was precision conventional
weapons and Canada had failed to keep pace.73
4 CIBG had finally become nuclear-capable, but the delay irritated
the Americans and limited their political payoff. Domestically,
the weapons became operational just as their popularity with the

“Report of the Ad-Hoc Committee on Defence Policy,” 30 September 1963, 82-83,
III.61, vol. 8, 87/253, Lindsey-Sutherland fonds, DHH.
71  
Campbell, Unlikely Diplomats, 156-58, 166-67. Technically, it was one-third of a
division, which can be translated a brigade. For aircraft, Canada was expected to
maintain one squadron of twenty-five aircraft for LB/FB (Light Bomber/Fighter
Bomber) strike and one squadron of LB/FB attack in 1958, with LB/FB attack
growing to three squadrons by 1961. See Military Committee, “MC 70 – The
Minimum Essential Force Requirements, 1958-1963,” 29 January 1958, 248, 274,
NATO Archives Online, accessed 30 May 2020, http://archives.nato.int/uploads/r/
null/1/0/105221/MC_0070_ENG_PDP.pdf; and Maloney, Learning to Love the
Bomb, 164.
72  
Maloney, Learning to Love the Bomb, 151, 160.
73  
“Report of the Ad-Hoc Committee on Defence Policy,” 30 September 1963, 14-15,
29-33, 35, 61, III.61, vol. 8, 87/253, Lindsey-Sutherland fonds, DHH.
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Canadian public waned and their military utility declined.74 Although
Canadian troops remained an important political commitment to the
Europeans, the security-resource payoff of an expensive, nucleararmed mechanised brigade was weakening. Sutherland’s committee
recommended a re-evaluation of Canada’s ground commitment and
looked at a number of alternatives. The options included committing
troops to European defence but basing them in Canada;75 creating a
self-projecting “triphibious” force of roughly a brigade group strength
to respond to crises on NATO’s flanks;76 re-negotiating Canadian
commitment to SACEUR from a standard brigade to air-transportable
reinforcements;77 and finally, transforming the large central front
commitment into a prospective NATO mobile force co-located with
Canadian air assets.78 One option, the relocation of the brigade to a
less prominent position near Canadian airfields in southern Germany,
would have given a stronger national character to the commitment
and involved a reduction in size—not to mention a non-nuclear role.

Public support for nuclear weapons dropped considerably during the 1960s. In
1963, 58% of respondents agreed that Canadian forces should be nuclear armed;
by 1968, that number fell to 41.7%. Gallup Canada Inc., “Dataset: Canadian
Gallup Poll, March 1963, #301,” <odesi> Database, accessed 12 April 2019,
http://odesi2.scholarsportal.info/webview/index.jsp?object=http://142.150.1
90.128:80%2Fobj%2FfStudy%2Fcipo-301-E-1963-03&mode=documentation&
v=2&top=yes; Gallup Canada Inc., “Dataset: Canadian Gallup Poll, June 1966,
#319,” <odesi> Database, accessed 12 April 2019, http://odesi2.scholarsportal.
info/webview/index.jsp?object=http://142.150.190.128:80%2Fobj%2FfStudy%
2Fcipo-319-E-1966-06&mode=documentation&v=2&top=yes. Notably, a 1968
poll still showed a strong majority (71.3%) of respondents supported Canadian
troops remaining in Europe. See Gallup Canada Inc., “Dataset: Canadian
Gallup Poll, October 1968, #332,” <odesi> Database, accessed 12 April 2019,
http://odesi2.scholarsportal.info/webview/index.jsp?object=http://142.150.190.128
:80%2Fobj%2FfStudy%2Fcipo-332-E-1968-08&mode=documentation&v=2&top=y
es; and “Report of the Ad-Hoc Committee on Defence Policy,” 30 September 1963,
33, III.61, vol. 8, 87/253, Lindsey-Sutherland fonds, DHH.
75  
“Report of the Ad-Hoc Committee on Defence Policy,” 30 September 1963, 17-20,
III.61, vol. 8, 87/253, Lindsey-Sutherland fonds, DHH.
76  
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Strikingly, this option was roughly analogous in many ways to the
downsizing of the brigade from 1969 to 1972.79
The report noted a number of technical issues with the strike/
reconnaissance role. For one, the committee estimated that the
CF-104 would likely approach the end of its service life somewhere
between 1969 and 1972 with an absolute end date of no later than
1975 (in the end, they flew until 1987).80 Moreover, the advent of a
Soviet second strike deterrent made the chances of a NATO first
strike extremely low as there was no logical way that NATO could
employ nuclear weapons against the Soviets without facing nuclear
devastation themselves. The Starfighters, then, were likely vulnerable
to either an early nuclear strike or increasingly effective enemy air
defences if they survived the wave of Soviet attacks. Surface-tosurface missiles would be a cheaper and more survivable option if
Canada wanted to continue in a nuclear delivery role.81 Thus, it made
sense to switch 1 CAD to a “general tactical air support” platform,
ideally the F-4 Phantom II sometime in 1969, with an intermediate
period of using the CF-104s in a conventional role.82
The careful weighing of options in the report paved the way for
the 1964 White Paper on Defence. NATO commitments remained
largely the same, but the document indicated that change was
desirable. The white paper lifted its passages on nuclear commitments
almost verbatim from the Sutherland Report, concluding that “[h]
aving accepted the responsibility for membership in a nuclear-armed
It is unlikely that Sutherland had cuts in mind that went as deep as Trudeau’s
did: halving of the force to 2,800 troops. The mobile force would have also likely been
air transportable, as opposed to merely the watered-down version of the mechanised
force that remained after the Trudeau cuts. See J.L. Granatstein, Canada’s Army:
Waging War and Keeping the Peace (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002),
363-64.
80  
Sutherland, “Trends in Strategic Weapons and Concepts – Lecture to the National
Defence College by R.J. Sutherland,” 11 March 1963, III.72, vol. 1, 87/253, LindseySutherland fonds, DHH. The CF-18 was selected as a replacement in 1984 for the
CF-101, CF-5 and CF-104 but took time to phase in. By the end of its service life,
the CF-104 had had an extremely high mishap rate of 18.5 incidents per 100 flight
hours (in contrast, the CF-18 had a predicted rate of 5.6 and an actual rate in the
first ten years of usage of 7.14). See Richard Shimooka, “Training at the Edge: The
Canadian Air Force’s Transition to the CF-18, and Lessons Learned for Canada’s
Next Generation Fighter,” Canadian Military Journal 15, 4 (Autumn 2015): 31.
81  
“Report of the Ad-Hoc Committee on Defence Policy,” 30 September 1963, 97,
III.61, vol. 8, 87/253, Lindsey-Sutherland fonds, DHH.
82  
“Report of the Ad-Hoc Committee on Defence Policy,” 30 September 1963, 99100, 119, III.61, vol. 8, 87/253, Lindsey-Sutherland fonds, DHH.
79  
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alliance, the question of nuclear weapons for the Canadian armed
forces is a subordinate issue. It depends how we can most effectively
contribute to collective strength.”83 Understood in this context, air
defence was framed in terms of the less important role of the bomber:
while still vital, its value would “gradually decline” over the course
of the decade as the ICBM threat grew and the likelihood of a costeffective defence against ICBMs remained low.84
The discussion of Canadian nuclear delivery systems allocated to
NATO commitments was less technical and more political. Although
the new policy kept NATO commitments, it framed them in political,
not military, terms:
[the brigade’s] presence, moreover, has a political significance for the
Alliance, and its withdrawal from front-line positions at this time could
be misinterpreted – by both our European allies and the Soviet bloc.
The importance to the Alliance’s solidarity of Canadian ‘presence’ in
the NATO defence forces is real […] chang[e] [should happen] gradually,
in conformity to a relatively long term plan of action.85

In contrast to the public white paper, the classified Sutherland
Report had advocated for long-term doctrinal development to pave
the way towards lighter, more mobile and crucially non-nuclear forces
as an effective contribution to NATO’s strength, allowing Ottawa’s
contribution to “accor[d] with Canada’s geographic location and
other Canadian defence interests.”86
The white paper contained no such ambiguity about the air division.
Canada would phase out the strike/reconnaissance role, allow the
CF-104 squadrons to attrite and look for a “high performance aircraft
[…] to provide sufficient flexibility for any task we might undertake
from ground attack to air surveillance.”87 The Sutherland Report
noted that a Canadian air presence in Europe, especially in terms of
infrastructure, would be required to allow for rapid reinforcement of
fighter squadrons from aircraft based in Canada. Because the RCAF
Department of National Defence, White Paper on Defence (Ottawa: Queen’s
Printer, 1964), 13.
84  
Department of National Defence, White Paper on Defence (1964), 14.
85  
Department of National Defence, White Paper on Defence (1964), 21.
86  
“Report of the Ad-Hoc Committee on Defence Policy,” 30 September 1963, 16061, III.61, vol. 8, 87/253, Lindsey-Sutherland fonds, DHH.
87  
Department of National Defence, White Paper on Defence (1964), 22.
83  
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operated separate specialised fleets—the CF-101 in Canada and CF104 in Europe—Ottawa could not reinforce Europe smoothly in the
event of a regional crisis. It therefore made sense to move towards a
multi-role aircraft, which made the specialised CF-104 impracticable.
The white paper, by emphasising flexibility provided by a single fleet,
reflected the Sutherland Report’s emphasis on framing commitments
with the unity of security in mind. Sean Maloney argues that the
CF-104 continued to have military relevance vis-à-vis missiles
despite the criticisms of contemporary observers and that phasing
out strike/reconnaissance was misguided for both technical and
operational reasons.88 On a tactical level, Maloney is correct, but
misses Sutherland’s larger point: strike/reconnaissance was not a wise
use of diminishing military resources in a Canadian national context.
The report further emphasised the Canadian perspective when it
recommended that the air division “be associated […] more directly
with the army brigade group in Europe.”89
Despite the innovative thinking in the Sutherland Report and
the political weight of a fresh white paper, the years between 1964
and 1968 saw no significant movement on the nuclear weapons
question. 4 CIBG retained its role as a heavy mechanised formation
backed by Honest Johns. A weak policy process turned the CF-104
replacement into a fiasco, with the RCAF receiving the nearly useless
CF-5 in 1968—an aircraft so underwhelming that it never managed
to replace the Starfighter, which stayed in Canadian inventory until
it was replaced by the CF-18 in the 1980s.90 “Vested interests in
the Department,” Sutherland lamented in 1964, seemed to inject
an insurmountable inertia to a real, rational reform of dispersed
commitments.91 With the government focussed on a range of other
issues, from healthcare to a new flag, departmental resistance and
the military issues associated with implementing unification, it was
Maloney, Learning to Love the Bomb, 25-26.
Department of National Defence, White Paper on Defence (1964), 22-23.
90  
R.J. Sutherland, “Budgeting and programming as tools of defence management,”
21 October 1963, 1-5, III.7, vol. 5, 87/253, Lindsey-Sutherland fonds, DHH; Program
Study Group, “Planning Programming, Budgeting in the Department of National
Defence,” November 1966, III.55, vol. 8, 87/253, Lindsey-Sutherland fonds, DHH;
Ray Stouffer, “Cold War Air Power Choices for the RCAF: Paul Hellyer and the
Selection of the CF-5 Freedom Fighter,” Canadian Military Journal 7, 3 (Fall 2006):
64-65;and Stouffer, Swords, Clunks and Widowmakers, 111-12, 145.
91  
R.J. Sutherland to VCDS [Vice Chief of the Defence Staff] (presumed), untitled
memo, 20 February 1964, III.16, vol. 5, 87/253, Lindsey-Sutherland fonds, DHH.
88  
89  
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unlikely that any sane politician would force a review of perennially
difficult nuclear questions. As Sutherland put to the Vice Chief of the
Defence Staff in 1966:
There are certain questions answers to which would greatly simplify
our problems. These include the future of our forces in Europe, whether
or not we are going to continue to the NORAD agreement, and the
precise nature of the commitment with respect to peace-keeping and
strategically mobile forces. But the fact is that no Government in its
right mind is going to commit itself on these questions [emphasis
added].92

trudeau, the defence review and a new white paper
Although Sutherland was a key part of DRAE, he was not the
entirety of the organisation. This became painfully clear after he
died at work during one of his 15-hour workdays on 4 January 1967
at the age of forty-five.93 George Lindsey replaced him later that
month.94 Sutherland departed at an inopportune time as Pierre
Trudeau joined the Cabinet as Minister of Justice three months
later. Over the next year, the new minister developed an inner
circle of policy advisors who quickly progressed from constitutional
questions into those of defence and foreign policy, often with radical
conclusions. Trudeau became the leader of the Liberal Party in April
1968, followed the next year by an election where he gained the
first majority government since 1962. Diefenbaker and Pearson had
annoyed planners with their hedging, but Trudeau would frighten
them with his resolve.
Over the next three years, Trudeau demanded a return to first
principles in defence policy and proved to be remarkably malleable
in his views when a clearly argued rationale for a particular policy
could be made. One issue where this malleability showed itself was
NATO membership. There is some dispute as to just how much
R.J. Sutherland to VCDS, “Memorandum – Program Analysis,” 14 September
1965, III.16, vol. 5, 87/253, Lindsey-Sutherland fonds, DHH.
93  
Lee and Bellamy, “Dr. R.J. Sutherland: A Retrospective,” n.d., 3, III.0, vol. 5,
87/253, Lindsey-Sutherland fonds, DHH.
94  
DRB, “Announcement by Defence Research Board,” 24 January 1967, II.4, vol. 1,
87/253, Lindsey-Sutherland fonds, DHH.
92  
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of a NATO-sceptic Trudeau had been upon assuming power, but
there was no denying that he was, at some point, less than friendly
towards Canadian troops in Europe. This was especially true of
his foreign policy advisor, Ivan Head.95 Nonetheless, by the end of
the review process, Canada remained in NATO and the Canadian
troop commitment to Europe, although reduced, remained as well.
On the one hand, Trudeau was constrained by his ministers. Early
in the process, when he tabled a paper to Cabinet that proposed
slashing the armed forces defence minister Léo Cadieux, cowed him
by threatening to resign on the spot.96 On the other hand, the new
prime minister seemed genuinely interested in being convinced one
way or another. He often described Cabinet meetings as universitystyle “seminars,” injecting contrarian positions into the mix when he
felt that representatives from the ministries of defence or external
affairs were unwilling to do so, moving the discussion along until a
consensus was reached.97 When given a solid rationale, he changed
his mind, at least in degree if not direction. Donald MacDonald, who
took over as defence minister in September 1970, had argued heavily
against any NATO commitment during the reviews—a position that
would have seemed natural and logical to the Trudeau of 1968. Not
long after, he found the Prime Minister “scandalisé” by his views.98
Such an emphasis on a coherent ends-means justification would
have been music to Sutherland’s ears and proved to be a challenge
for George Lindsey’s able mind. From the election in the summer
of 1968 until the first major defence policy announcement in the
spring of 1969, the first battle in a long confrontation between the
Head would describe Trudeau as “not a hawk” on NATO, especially after a
1969 trip to see the “old guard” in Europe. He did confirm, however, that Trudeau
was hostile to the nuclear strike role. Donald MacDonald held that Trudeau “did
not share [MacDonald’s strong anti-NATO views] very strenuously.” Paul Hellyer
was convinced that Trudeau was committed to pulling Canadian troops out of
Europe in 1968, if not pulling out of the alliance altogether. He recollected that
Trudeau told him that “if he had his heart’s desire, he would pull the troops out.”
See Ivan Head, interviewed by Robert Bothwell and J.L. Granatstein, 6 August
1987, Accession 20150335, George Metcalf Archival Collection, MHRC; Donald
MacDonald, interviewed by Robert Bothwell and J.L. Granatstein, 5 April 1988,
Accession 20150335, George Metcalf Archival Collection, MHRC; and Paul Hellyer,
interviewed by Robert Bothwell and J.L. Granatstein, 6 November 1987, Accession
20150335, George Metcalf Archival Collection, MHRC.
96  
Granatstein and Bothwell, Pirouette, 4.
97  
Granatstein and Bothwell, Pirouette, 11-21.
98  
Granatstein and Bothwell, Pirouette, 15-16, 24-29.
95  
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pro-alignment faction— which included most of DND and DEA—
and a neutralist faction—primarily a group of select ministers and
advisers close to Trudeau—raged on over the issues of NORAD
and NATO membership. While Mitchell Sharp, Trudeau’s first
foreign minister, ordered an interdepartmental Special Task Force
on Europe (STAFEUR) to produce a review of Canadian policy
towards NATO, DND began a military-focussed defence policy review
(DPR).99 These processes produced a series of letter-denominated
“options” composed of non-aligned choices (A through D), aligned
options (E through G) and add-ons (H and I) to support the UN and
possibly even missions with the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation
(SEATO), the Organisation of American States (OAS) and the
Commonwealth (see Table 2). This kind of options-based analysis
was perfectly suited for the DRB, and DRAE more specifically, and
the Board’s support came in many forms. Lindsey’s direct advice
to Cabinet dealt with specific technical and theoretical issues; for
example, he briefed the Cabinet on air defence in September 1968,
helping to shape early thinking on the subject. Often, the language
used in these briefings was directly reflected in public policy
statements.100 The DRB also received drafts of the policy review
from the Deputy Minister for technical advice on everything from
strategic mobility to force composition. Notably, DPR discussions
included nuclear weapons, but never as an isolated subject.101
Trudeau’s hopes to get the defence review done by November
1968 proved to be too ambitious. For one, conducting a defence review
without conducting a general foreign policy review was impracticable;
STAFEUR had a limited scope and would not be completed until
February 1969.102 The DPR came out the same month, setting the
stage for the first major battle: a dramatic series of Cabinet meetings
that began on 29 March that pitted pro-NATO and anti-NATO
factions against each other, with salvoes of papers, counter-papers
Earlier reviews were completed but considered inadequate. See Granatstein and
Bothwell, Pirouette, 3-39.
100  
J.S. Nutt to Basil Robinson, “OPMA SITREP,” 12 September 1968, 40.1968(3),
vol. 3173, RG 25, Library and Archives Canada (LAC).
101  
G.R. Lindsey to Section Heads, DRAES 220-1 (C/DRAE), “Analytical
Contribution to Defence Policy Review,” 3 February 1969, II.12.2, vol. 2, 87/253,
Lindsey-Sutherland fonds, DHH.
102  
STAFEUR, “Canada and Europe: Report of the Special Task Force on Europe,”
February 1969, 36.1969.2, vol. 3171, RG 25, LAC; and C.J. Marhsall to Nutt, “Memo:
Defence Policy Review,” 11 September 1968, 2.16, vol. B41-1, MG 31, LAC.
99  
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Table 2: DPR Optionsv
Commitment
NORAD

Option

Name

A

“Light” Nonalignment

No

No

No

Internal security only

B

“Medium”
Nonalignment

No

No

No

Surveillance and control of territory; able
to counter “minor” incursions

C

“Heavy” NonAlignment

No

No

No

D

Participatory
NonAlignment

No

No

Participation in
peacekeeping

E

Bilateral
alignment
with US

Probably

Maybe
(primarily to
maintain
contact with
US)

Not defined

Not well defined, but focussed on North
America

v

NATO

UN

Role of Armed Forces

Defence against external attack
Defence against external attack, capable of
projection of peacekeeping ops

F

Active NATO Yes – force
/ Passive
levels not
defined
NORAD

Yes –
“passive”
only

Not defined

Internal security, surveillance and control
of territory. NATO focus

G

Active NATO Yes – force
levels not
/ Active
NORAD
defined

Yes – force
levels not
defined

Not defined

Internal security, surveillance, control,
“meaningful” contribution to both
European and North American defence

H

Peacekeeping
add-on

N/A

N/A

Yes

Additional peacekeeping capability to be
added on to options E-G

I

Asia /
Caribbean addon

N/A

N/A

N/A

Able to contribute to SEATO, ops in
Caribbean, OAS or ANZUS (the
Australia-New Zealand-US defence pact)

Marcel Cadieux to Mitchell Sharp, “Memorandum for the Minister – The Defence Policy Review,” 28 November 1968,
vol. 3173, RG 25, Library and Archives Canada.

and bitter confrontations. The battle climaxed with a provisional
statement to the media on Canadian defence policy that the Prime
Minister planned to announce ahead of NATO meetings in May.103
The DPR was a discussion paper, not an executive document. All
the same, the degree to which it was permeated by Sutherland’s and
Lindsey’s ideas and the lengths to which its language was replicated
in subsequent policy statements highlights just how important
DRAE’s analysis was in shaping decisions about denuclearisation.
In terms of nuclear weapons generally, the DPR noted that the
103  
Granatstein and Bothwell, Pirouette, 21-25; and P.E. Trudeau, “A defence policy
for Canada: Statement to the press on April 3 1969,” 3 April 1969, 20.7, vol. 4,
87/253, Lindsey-Sutherland fonds, DHH.
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advent of plentiful, reliable ICBMs in hardened launch sites and
a new generation of Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles in the
mid-1960s had “brought about a radical alteration of the strategic
situation.”104 This new environment made winning a nuclear war
virtually impossible. Instead of preparing for a conflict, nuclear
powers now increasingly sought a mix of capabilities that ensured
strategic stability. Moreover, this balance had a strong economic
component: “should B’s countermeasure cost him five times as much
as A’s measure, B will be penalised in his opportunity to use the
resources for other purposes in his defence program.”105 Military
effectiveness on its own was no longer a guarantee of safety and
attempts to achieve it would be counterproductive if they merely led
to bankruptcy.
The section of the DPR on air defence reflected much of Lindsey’s
and Sutherland’s evolving thinking on the subject. Because the goal
became the maintenance of strategic stability, the central aim of air
defence became to disincentivise the Soviets from building a new
generation of bombers. To do that, North American air defence forces
had to prevent the Soviets from using their current bombers, or
any aircraft that the Soviets might develop in the near future, from
delivering a first strike on American nuclear forces. Previously, a new
generation of Soviet bombers meant that the US and Canada had
to invest large sums in updating interceptor fleets. By emphasising
detection, Canada could invest in new airborne radar technologies
that would detect almost any foreseeable class of aircraft without
having to upgrade interceptor fleets. By having just enough in terms
of hard air defence to prevent a massive, undetected first strike, the
Canadian military could secure Canadian airspace without stressing
its economy. It naturally followed that the DPR recommended phasing
out nuclear weapons for air defence as better detection technologies
were phased in.106 Though the defence review was collectively authored,
the origin of this analysis can be inferred by a presentation given to
the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and
Defence by Lindsey in May 1969 where he listed the benefits of this
104  
“Defence Policy Review,” February 1969, 11, 8.13, vol. 2, 87/253, LindseySutherland fonds, DHH.
105  
“Defence Policy Review,” February 1969, 12-13, 8.13, vol. 2, 87/253, LindseySutherland fonds, DHH.
106  
“Defence Policy Review,” February 1969, 13-15, 85, 8.13, vol. 2, 87/253, LindseySutherland fonds, DHH. See also Maloney, Learning to Love the Bomb, 25.
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technology, with both documents warning against action that might
encourage the Soviets to build “a new generation of bombers.”107
The inclusion of both technical and economic factors into
the discussion of Canada’s European commitments had a strong
resemblance to previous DRAE studies. In the short term, the review
noted that continuing the strike/reconnaissance role would be the
cheapest. However, since the CF-104 was expected to be obsolete by
1978, it made sense at that point to find a new role for Canadian
aviators in Europe, such as air defence, air superiority or air
transport.108 As we have seen, these questions were nothing new. As
for ground commitment, the document mostly rehashed discussions in
the Sutherland Report: it compared the benefits of air-transportable
versus mechanised forces, as well as the possibilities and problems
with relocating to a base “west of the Rhine.”109 Importantly, it noted
that 4 CIBG would have to either be re-equipped to properly fulfill
its Central Front role or find a new role between 1974 and 1978. The
brigade’s Centurion tanks were starting to look very dated and the
Americans would begin replacing their Honest Johns with the MGM52 Lance in 1972.110 Maintaining the NATO status quo, then, was a
positive choice requiring significant capital investment. This was the
kind of global analysis, based on strategic-technical flexibility and a
firm security-resource calculation, that Sutherland had been calling
for since 1963.
The first major battle over defence policy ended with Trudeau’s
statement to the media on 3 April 1969. Although reductions would
be coming, Canada would remain in NATO and would continue to
commit forces to Europe. At the core of the statement was a new
listing of priorities for the armed forces:

Lindsey, Strategic Weapons Systems, Stability, and the Possible Contribution by
Canada, 33-36. See also “The Defence Policy Review,” February 1969, 14, 8.13, vol.
2, 87/253, Lindsey-Sutherland fonds, DHH.
108  
“The Defence Policy Review,” February 1969, 101-02, 8.13, vol. 2, 87/253,
Lindsey-Sutherland fonds, DHH.
109  
“The Defence Policy Review,” February 1969, 102-03, 8.13, vol. 2, 87/253,
Lindsey-Sutherland fonds, DHH.
110  
Stephen A. Gomes, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons in the Cold War Era…A Blast
from the Past,” Combating WMD Journal 3 (2009): 51; and “MGR Honest John
(M31 / M190),” Jane’s IHS, accessed 8 April 2019, https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/
Display/jsws0591-jsws.
107  
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a) the surveillance of our own territory and coast-lines […]
b) the defence of North America in co-operation with United States forces;
c) the fulfilment of such NATO commitment as may be agreed upon; and
d) the performance of such international peacekeeping roles as we may,
from time to time, assume.111

This was an inversion of the priorities of the 1964 white paper, which
put peacekeeping on top, and has been condemned by John English
and others as unwarranted political meddling in military thinking.112
On one level, the new priorities came out of an intensely political
process. But it was a technically-informed political process and
DRAE studies had listed a similar order of priorities for increasingly
scarce defence resources as far back as 1963, when a programming
study listed the following as a priority for resource allocation:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Defence of Canada
Continental Air Defence
Defence of NATO Europe
Maritime Warfare
UN forces113

A balance of probabilities suggests that Lindsey’s and Sutherland’s
thinking had an impact on the re-prioritisation of Canadian defence
commitments during the DPR. Concerns about a mismatch among
priorities, means and roles had circulated among Canadian strategists
throughout the 1960s. Further, it is also clear that Sutherland’s and
Lindsey’s ideas had a wide enough exposure at enough levels of
government to make a real impact on thinking about these problems.
Sutherland’s idea of an “involuntary guarantee,” for example, came
up in a 1987 interview with John F. Anderson, who contributed
to the DPR and went on to become Assistant Deputy Minister for
Policy in 1978. Moreover, the similarity in wording between elements
of the DPR and Lindsey’s presentation to SCEAND suggests that
many DRAE contributions to the report survived the bureaucratic
Trudeau, “A defence policy for Canada: Statement to the press on April 3 1969,”
3 April 1969, 20.7, vol. 4, 87/253, Lindsey-Sutherland fonds, DHH.
112  
English, Lament for an Army, 52-53; and Granatstein and Bothwell, Pirouette,
237.
113  
Sutherland, “Budgeting and programming as tools of defence management,” 21
October 1963, 15-16, III.7, vol. 5, 87/253, Lindsey-Sutherland fonds, DHH.
111  
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“churn” virtually unharmed, with the result that both their ideas
and their language shaped official policy documents. The DPR was
only the first battle and the campaign continued as External Affairs
led a more comprehensive foreign policy review while DND forged
ahead with a new white paper, Defence in the ’70s, released in
August 1971.
Donald MacDonald oversaw the drafting of Defence in the ‘70s
after taking over as defence minister in September 1970. Despite
being sceptical of NATO, MacDonald was constrained by the Prime
Minister’s statement of 3 April 1969. NATO membership was settled,
no further troop cuts were contemplated and no more money was
coming. Moreover, MacDonald and his advisors did not operate
in isolation. The “seminars” continued as did Trudeau’s direct
participation in policy development—his relentless push for conceptual
clarity would keep DRAE busy. In a memorandum to Cabinet on 3
November 1969, the Prime Minister addressed the renewal of the
SAC overflights and refuelling agreement and suggested a review
of arrangements that allowed for the dispersal of US interceptors to
Canadian airfields during an emergency. Could continued Canadian
support be misconstrued as assistance to a US first-strike capability?
He then proposed that “Canadian territory be used solely for
purposes which are defensive in the judgement of the Government of
Canada.”114 The DRAE commentary on these concerns, and the final
wording of the white paper on this issue, suggests how much of an
influence Lindsey had on the final product. In a draft commentary,
DRAE took issue with the word “defensive.” In the nuclear context,
Lindsey argued that “‘defensive’, and its opposite ‘offensive’ are
terms so easily capable of manipulation as to be the source of endless
argument and confusion.”115 Lindsey returned to his position from
the DPR: what mattered was maintaining the strategic balance and
disincentivising further Soviet bomber or submarine production.116 He
put forth an alternative wording for a policy statement where, instead

Granatstein and Bothwell, Pirouette, 236-37; and Pierre Trudeau to Léo Cadieux,
“North American Defence Policy,” 3 November 1969, II.8.11b, vol. 1, 87/253,
Lindsey-Sutherland fonds, DHH.
115  
G.R. Lindsey, “Early Draft of Commentary on the PM’s Memo for Cabinet
on North American Defence,” 14 November 1969, II.8.10, vol. 1, 87/253, LindseySutherland fonds, DHH.
116  
G.R. Lindsey (presumed), “Draft – Defence, Offence and Deterrence,” 17
November 1967, II.8.11, vol. 1, 87/253, Lindsey-Sutherland fonds, DHH.
114  
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of “defensive” roles, Canada would take on those “purposes which
in the Canadian government contribute to the maintenance of peace
and the deterrence of nuclear war.”117
In the end, much of Defence in the ‘70s sounded much more
like the DRAE commentary than the Prime Minister’s memo. Some
sections read as if pulled directly from DRAE papers. The section on
nuclear deterrence notes that:
[…] from a potential enemy’s point of view, however, North America
can only logically be seen as one set of targets. Canada’s centres of
population and industry logically form part of the major target plan for
a strategic nuclear attack on North America.118

This notion, and even much of the wording, had a long pedigree
in Canadian strategic thinking. As far back as 1962, Sutherland
had argued:
Owing to the close integration of the American and Canadian economies,
an attempt to destroy the productive capacity of the United States
would almost certainly result in some Canadian targets being attacked.
The two countries constitute a single target system: it would not make
sense to attack the United States and leave Canada alone.119

Individual nuclear systems were thus less important for the fact that
they were nuclear than that they were an efficient use of Canadian
military resources in a way that would promote a stable strategic
balance and support upcoming arms limitation negotiations.120
The AIR-2 Genie remained in the Canadian inventory in order “to
play an effective role in the defence of North America against a
massive nuclear attack” and was eventually phased out alongside US
stockpiles in the mid-1980s.121 The BOMARC was retired, largely
117  
Lindsey, “Early Draft of Commentary on the PM’s Memo for Cabinet on North
American Defence,” 14 November 1969, II.8.10, vol. 1, 87/253, Lindsey-Sutherland
fonds, DHH.
118  
Department of National Defence, Defence in the ‘70s: White Paper on Defence
(Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1971), 25. For the purposes of this study, the 1971 White
Paper on Defence will be referred to as Defence in the ‘70s.
119  
Sutherland, “Canada’s Long Term Strategic Situation,” 204.
120  
Specifically, SALT I, which began in 1969. Department of National Defence,
Defence in the ‘70s, 4-7.
121  
Department of National Defence, Defence in the ‘70s, 30.
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because it was obsolete; it was similarly phased out of US service in
1972.122 A prime minister who had branded Pearson as a “defrocked
prince of peace”123 for accepting the nuclear warheads in 1963 ended
up keeping some of those very same warheads in Canadian hands for
nearly twenty years.
Defence in the ‘70s is far less clear about NATO nuclear roles.
The retirement of the Honest John and the end of the CF-104 strike/
reconnaissance roles were mentioned, but not described in detail.124
This is partly because NATO force reductions had been implemented
in 1969, well before the white paper was released. The decision to
reduce the size of Canada’s forces and relocate them from the Central
Front to a reserve role has been discussed extensively elsewhere,125
but it is worth noting that elements of the rationale—giving the
Canadian forces in Europe a “distinct Canadian identity”—goes back
to the Sutherland Report.126 As for the change in the CF-104’s role,
the paper gave very little strategic rationale for abandoning strike/
reconnaissance. DRAE analyses had generally been supportive of the
role in raw strategic terms but these same analyses argued that it was
inefficient to maintain separate fleets of aircraft for North American
air defence and NATO tasks. Given that the CF-5 purchased by
the Liberals had failed as an attempt to replace the Starfighters five
years earlier, it is somewhat understandable that the white paper
avoided such an awkward conversation.

It is difficult to ascertain exactly when this missile was retired from US service.
Boeing claims the “early 1980s,” whereas the National Museum of the United States
Air Force claims “mid 1980s.” See “MB-1/AIR-2 Genie Missile,” Boeing, accessed 23
May 2019, http://www.boeing.com/history/products/mb-1-air-2-genie-missile.page;
and “McDonnell Douglas AIR-2A Genie Rocket,” National Museum of the United
States Air Force, accessed 23 May 2019, https://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/Visit/
Museum-Exhibits/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/197594/mcdonnell-douglas-air-2agenie-rocket/.
123  
Maloney, Learning to Love the Bomb, 299.
124  
Department of National Defence, Defence in the ‘70s, 30.
125  
See especially Roy Rempel, Counterweights: The Failure of Canada’s German
and European Policy 1955-1995 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University
Press, 1996).
126  
Department of National Defence, Defence in the ’70s, 34.
122  
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conclusions
Defence in the ’70s was about much more than nuclear weapons.
There are wide swathes of the paper that have little to do with
strategy and bear no signs of DRAE influence. There are other
portions—such as the composition of the reduced Canadian ground
forces in Europe—where DRAE analysts did have much to say, but
those subjects are outside the scope of this paper. Some of the text
in the white paper, such as those claiming the suitability of the
CF-5 for operations in Europe, were plainly wrong and undoubtedly
bothered Lindsey as much as the pilots who had to fly them.127
Granatstein and Bothwell have good reason to describe the force
reductions, budget reductions and organisational restructuring of the
Trudeau years as a “long, dark night of the spirit” for the Canadian
military.128 In terms of nuclear weapons divestment, however, the
question must be reiterated: was the decision to partially denuclearise
driven solely by political “amateurs” or did professional strategists
have an influence?
The balance of probabilities indicates that many of Lindsey’s and
Sutherland’s ideas provided a strategic grammar that shaped both
denuclearisation and wider defence policy documents. There was a
clear pathway for their analyses to move from DRAE to decision
makers and advisors. Moreover, given the lack of similar advisory
bodies in government or think tanks in the 1960s, there were few rival
conceptualisations for policymakers to draw from. Even where there
were disagreements about nuclear policy, many of the disagreements
employed a strategic grammar provided by Lindsey and Sutherland.
To have Sutherland’s “involuntary guarantee” referred to by a
former assistant deputy minister more than two decades after the
publication of “Canada’s Long Term Strategic Situation” speaks to
the importance of the concept in shaping Canadian thinking on the
technical and geographical aspects of its alliances.
It may be tempting to argue that this strategic grammar was
nothing more than a convenient lexicon to smooth policy changes at
the Cabinet level with the polish of “objective” thinking, but a close
look at final policy products indicates otherwise. The mere existence
of a Sutherland Report in contemporary government vernacular, and
Department of National Defence, Defence in the ‘70s, 35-36.
Granatstein and Bothwell, Pirouette, 234.
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the similarity of the report to the 1964 White Paper on Defence,
makes a clear case that he had a direct influence on government
policy. In Lindsey’s case, Trudeau’s acceptance of a strategic
balancing, instead of strategic defence, serves as an instance where
Lindsey’s arguments had a clear impact in shaping Canadian defence
policy. Other, more conditional similarities, such as the similarity in
language between Lindsey’s presentation to SCEAND and the DPR,
suggest that this was not a singular event and that the influence
survived both Sutherland’s death and Trudeau’s ascent. Pittfield’s
observation that many in the DEA viewed Lindsey with hostility not
because of his ideas, but specifically because of his rival influence on
policy, is a telling one. In normal society, imitation is the subtlest
form of flattery. In a bureaucracy, it is jealousy.
The strategic dependency thesis elaborated by Gray is somewhat
weaker in light of this analysis. Not only were Canadian strategists
thinking about wider nuclear issues, they were thinking about them in
a way that was directly applicable to their national strategic context.
This finding strengthens Richter’s thesis and historians studying
Canadian defence and nuclear policy during this era should consider
how Canadian strategic thinkers interacted with a wider body of
thinking on nuclear issues during the Cold War.
The reader should also question whether the near-total allocation
of responsibility for partial denuclearisation given to Pierre
Trudeau—the Trudeau ex machina explanation—is sustainable.
Trudeau undoubtedly had a large influence on Canadian defence
and foreign policies. But Trudeau’s push for a rethink on nuclear
issues had precedents. Many of the questions asked in 1968 had
been asked as far back as 1962, reiterated in the Sutherland
Report of 1963 and touched on in the 1964 White Paper. Political
lethargy and service parochialism created an increasingly large gulf
between Canada’s economic and strategic situation and its military
ambitions. By 1963, even notable military officers like Guy Simonds,
one of Canada’s best battlefield commanders and Chief of the
General Staff from 1951-1955, and Charles Foulkes, Canada’s first
Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (1951-1960), publicly
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opposed Canada’s nuclear commitments to NATO.129 Serious
contradictions in Canadian defence policy had underpinned many
of the nation’s nuclear acquisitions and someone as intellectually
rigorous as Trudeau was bound to find them.
The DRB did not escape the upheaval of the Trudeau years.
Reorganisations in the 1970s separated DRAE from the rest of the
operational research establishment and tucked it under the Assistant
Deputy Minister for Policy.130 Lindsey, however, passed the torch. In
the 1970s and 1980s, The Canadian Defence Quarterly, which had
been host to many forward-thinking articles about doctrine in the
interwar period, was reborn. Ironically, its first feature article was
by Colin S. Gray, who propounded Canada’s lack of strategists.131 It
was also at this time that DND began sponsoring strategic studies at
Canadian universities, allowing for an academic treatment of defence
problems from a uniquely Canadian perspective.132 The era of strategic
thought that began with Sutherland’s contributions in the 1950s and
ended with the Trudeau reviews had passed. A new generation of
thinkers would have to take on the intractable problems of a country
described by Desmond Morton as “simultaneously indefensible and
invulnerable.”133
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